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JB

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

JCSM-646-66

7 OCT 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: World-Wide US Military Posture (U)

NND 941082
NCC 4/30/96

1. (TS) Reference is made to:

a. JCSM-721-65, dated 24 September 1965, subject: "US Military Posture (U)," which provided the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the US military posture, considering the impact of deployments in support of the war in Southeast Asia.

b. JCSM-506-66, dated 5 August 1966, subject: "CINCPAC CY 1966 Adjusted Force Requirements and CY 1967 Force Requirements (U)," which forwarded CINCPAC's CY 1966 (adjusted) and CY 1967 force requirements and, with the exception of certain requirements for which additional justification was needed, validated for force planning purposes and budget guidance CINCPAC's proposed force additions.

c. JCSM-613-66, dated 24 September 1966, subject: "CINCPAC CY 1966 Adjusted Force Requirements and CY 1967 Force Requirements (U)," which provided the results of a review of that portion of CINCPAC's force requirements which were not validated for force planning purposes and budget guidance in JCSM-506-66, referred to in subparagraph b, above.

2. (TS) This is a preliminary assessment of the impact on the world-wide US military posture which would result from deployments during CY 1966 and CY 1967, based on force requirements stated by CINCPAC (does not include the corps contingency force). This assessment also tentatively identifies the deficiencies which would result when forces are deployed to meet CINCPAC's requirements.

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3. (TS) The US military posture has been measured in terms of the strategic concept contained in JCSM-721-65. Based on this strategic concept, the following objectives must be achieved and maintained:

a. In conjunction with allied forces, maintain forward deployments world-wide to deter communist aggression.

b. A military capability to support NATO/Europe obligations with active, readily deployable forces through the first month (M/D+30) in the event or imminence of hostilities.

c. A military capability to conduct other contingency operations in which force commitments are of a minor nature but where timely commitment of such forces may be crucial to the attainment of US objectives.

d. Support military operations in Southeast Asia.

e. Maintain an adequate training and rotation base to support the above.

4. (TS) The proposed deployments would have an impact on the ability of the Services to meet the foregoing objectives. The following conditions were used in determining this impact:

a. No call up of reserves or further extension of terms of service would be made.

b. No change would be made in rotation policies.

c. Resources to meet the proposed deployments would be obtained from the world-wide military structure.

5. (TS) A summarization of Appendices A through D, prepared by the Services, which highlights the impact on US military posture, is as follows:

a. Army Forces

(1) The majority of CINCPAC's add-on requirements for Army forces in CY 1966 consist of support forces; his new CY 1967 requirements for Army forces include 12 maneuver battalions.

(2) The Army can meet CINCPAC's requirements on a time schedule which on the average is six to eight months later than CINCPAC's schedule.

(3) The most significant impact of meeting CINCPAC requirements and the one which would have the greatest

effect on posture is the condition of the CONUS STRAF. In order to reinforce Europe or other areas from the STRAF rapidly, the Army will have available only two airborne brigade forces throughout 1967 and for the first half of 1968. Equipment shortages and requirements to sustain other deployments will prevent NATO-reinforcing division forces (armored and mechanized) from reaching a combat-ready status until late 1968.

(4) The Army can maintain other overseas unit deployments with the following impacts:

(a) USAREUR strength will be restored by bulk fill by end CY 1966, but command effectiveness would continue to be at a reduced level because of the qualitative personnel withdrawals (up to 50 percent of the officer and 80 percent of the skilled enlisted strength).

(b) In USARAL, the two maneuver battalions withdrawn in 1966 cannot be replaced before end CY 1967.

(c) The forces deployed in USARSOUTHCOM and in Korea would have personnel deficiencies similar to those of USAREUR.

(d) The Army part of the PACOM reserve will be limited to one brigade in Hawaii which will be ready after April 1967.

(5) The reserves will be at a low level of readiness at the very time greater dependence need be placed on them as a result of the degradation of the capability of the active Army. It is estimated that by end CY 1967, the reserve components will have zero assets in approximately 30 percent of the authorized equipment line items.

(6) The Army has a force deficiency of three and two-thirds active division forces to satisfy strategic reserve and sustaining base requirements. Prompt action to obtain additional funding and accelerated procurement authorization for necessary equipment would allow selective activation of the combat units and essential support forces. Although these actions would not solve the immediate problem, they would permit the earliest reconstitution of the STRAF, on an incremental basis, to a level which would reduce the risk to the nation in carrying out the strategy outlined in JCSM-721-65.

b. Navy Forces

(1) The additional Navy forces required in CINCPAC's adjusted CY 1966 requirements to be deployed to the Western Pacific include one attack carrier (CVA), three cruisers or frigates, and four destroyers (DD). The additional CY 1967 forces include one heavy cruiser, eight DD, two amphibious ships, and one ammunition ship. Excluding mobilization or the acquisition of new assets, these forces could only be supplied by diverting LANTCOM/EUCOM assets to PACOM.

(2) In order to provide a sixth attack carrier strike group to the Seventh Fleet, it would be necessary to withdraw one CVA and four DD from EUCOM. In addition, it might be necessary to withdraw the other CVA periodically.

(3) At least 17 CVA (with embarked attack carrier air wings (CVW)) are required to maintain seven continuously deployed. With a current force level of 15 CVA/CVW, a deficiency of two CVA/CVW is indicated. The next new construction CVA (JOHN F. KENNEDY) does not become operational until FY 3/69. As an interim measure, INTREPID, an antisubmarine warfare carrier (CVS), is now operating in a limited attack role to alleviate partially this shortfall. LEXINGTON, if similarly utilized, would further alleviate it. Additionally, it would require activating and modifying a CVS now in the Naval Reserve Fleet to replace LEXINGTON in her role as the training carrier. It would take 12 to 18 months to carry out such a proposal.

(4) The most serious impact on the Navy would be a further aggravation of the carrier pilot shortage. It would not be possible to maintain the present two combat tour limit for naval aviators as a result of the number of pilots who would accumulate combat time.

(5) Additionally, a deficit of 12 attack squadrons, one heavy cruiser, 40 destroyers, three patrol squadrons, and additional training aircraft is indicated. These forces are required to provide support for Southeast Asia operations and an adequate training and rotation base.

(6) If the forces are provided from LANTCOM/EUCOM assets, USCINCEUR would have a capability to support the SIOP/SSP with Navy general purpose forces ranging from zero to 50 percent of his requirement. CINCLANT's

capability to respond to contingencies and provide augmentation forces to other unified commanders would be reduced by an average of 20 percent during 1967. During the last half of that year, it would be reduced by over 50 percent.

c. Air Force Forces

(1) Upon completion of deployments to Southeast Asia in September 1967, the CONUS tactical air forces would not have a capability to deploy rapidly combat-ready tactical fighter forces. The CONUS tactical fighter and reconnaissance forces not deployed would, with one exception (dual-based tactical reconnaissance squadron), be committed entirely to the task of training.

(2) If it is necessary to provide the tactical fighter squadrons required by CINCPAC from within the presently approved force, at end FY 1/68 tactical fighter forces in USAFE would be drawn down from 21 TFS (486 aircraft) to 13 squadrons (288 aircraft) in order to maintain the force in Southeast Asia and the training base. By end FY 1968, all but one TFS (18 aircraft) plus 54 additional aircraft withdrawn from the remaining squadrons could be returned to USAFE.

(3) It should be noted that current estimates of Air Force deployment and restoration capabilities are very sensitive to attrition rates, replacement training requirements, and other factors, all of which are subject to changes that may affect future capabilities.

(4) In order to have an adequate strategic reserve for early reinforcement of Europe or for other contingencies, STRICOM should have a minimum of 37 TFSs, 12 TCSs, and eight TRSs available for deployment. This capability should be independent of the units required for replacement training (RTUs) and units drawn down from USAFE to meet PACOM requirements. However, even with the present RTUs included as deployable units under periods of increased tension (they would require from two to six weeks to be made deployable at reduced capability) and assuming Southeast Asia deployments, there would remain a deficit in responding to NATO commitments and reinforcement at end FY 1/68 as follows:

(a) TFS - 22 (446 aircraft) (18+ sqdn equivalents
at 24 UE)

(b) TRS - 5 (90 aircraft)

(c) TCS - 4 (64 aircraft)

(5) The US Air Force tactical fighter, tactical reconnaissance, and tactical airlift force would be underequipped by approximately 20 tactical fighter squadrons (22+ sqdn equivalents at 24 UE), five tactical reconnaissance squadrons, and four troop carrier squadrons (C-130), assuming that attrition losses in Southeast Asia remain consistent with current experience. These shortages take current production schedules into account.

(6) The deployment of ten additional US Air Force tactical jet squadrons into Southeast Asia would require the construction of base V-1 in Vietnam and the completion of Nam Phong Air Base in Thailand from a bare base to a main operating base (MOB) capability. It would be operationally acceptable to accommodate some of the additional seven squadrons on existing bases in Vietnam when Tuy Hoa and Phu Cat achieved MOB status, providing necessary additional construction is completed. Nam Phong Air Base would have to reach MOB status in order to accommodate the Thailand deployments.

(7) Command, control, and communications requirements would be essentially limited to those needed to support the additional jet air base in South Vietnam and to upgrade the existing bare base in Thailand. Standard base communications, air traffic control, and meteorological facilities would be involved. These could be provided initially from existing Air Force resources but replacement equipment would have to be procured during FY 1968 if an appropriate reserve of this type equipment is to be maintained.

(8) Continued support of the high-tempo operations in Southeast Asia has created shortages of pilots trained in particular aircraft and resulted in requirements for drastic actions to rectify the situation. The impacts on USAFE, in particular, are undesirable and incompatible with our commitments to NATO. The net effect of pilot shortages is the reduction of USAFE's capability to a level which will barely meet current Nuclear Strike Plan requirements. Any increase in Southeast Asia deployments would aggravate an already criticial situation.

(9) Prompt approval of action to permit the Air Force to acquire those forces indicated as deficiencies in Table I, Appendix C, together with a proportionate additional capability in the training and rotation base, would be required to reconstitute the strategic reserve.

d. Marine Corps Forces

(1) Under the conditions noted in paragraph 4, above, the Marine Corps could not make and support the additional deployments as requested by CINCPAC within current personnel resources. In order to support the required deployments even on a later schedule, additional personnel, unit activations, and a substantial increase in the Marine Corps training and rotation base would be required.

(2) The minimum acceptable amphibious posture for a national strategic amphibious reserve in-theater has been established as one active, combat-ready, uncommitted division/wing team in LANTCOM and one in PACOM. This capability, less one attack squadron, will not be attained in PACOM until 3rd quarter CY 1967 when newly activated units already authorized attain a combat-ready status. Any drawdowns on this capability for in-country deployments should be reconstituted at an accelerated rate. The Marine Corps does not have the assets to reconstitute any such drawdowns. CINCPAC's requested deployments to Okinawa would also seriously reduce East Coast helicopter squadrons and result in an imbalance in the LANTCOM division/wing team. If the possible in-country requirement for an additional 6/9 division/wing team should materialize, further drawdowns on the LANTCOM division/wing team would be necessary.

6. (TS) In assessing the impact of CINCPAC requirements on US military posture world-wide, consideration was also given to the extent to which mobilization of the reserves could alleviate Service shortfalls.

a. Army. Significant withdrawals of equipment have been made from the reserve components to support new activations. This has resulted in a degradation of the training capability and the mobilization potential of the reserve components. Therefore, full or partial mobilization of reserve units would have only limited effectiveness in accelerating Army deployments. However, mobilization of reserve units would permit a more rapid restoration, personnel-wise, of the STRAF. In addition, reserve unit mobilization and subsequent deployment of these units to Europe or Korea would accelerate restoration of Army forces in those areas. Selective mobilization of reservists possessing critical skills could greatly improve the quality of the training and sustaining base and the quality of deploying units which are now having to deploy with shortages of skills and experienced leaders. Selective mobilization would permit some acceleration of unit deployments. At Tab F to Appendix A is a chart depicting the effect of mobilization on the force structure of the Army.

b. Navy

(1) There are 165 light attack aircraft (A4B) and 121 fighter and 396 attack fleet qualified aviators in the Naval Reserve. Call up of 517 aviators would provide complements for 12 attack squadrons and alleviate the pilot shortage by five percent. Withdrawal and modification of 126 attack aircraft from the Naval Reserve would provide assets for the activation of nine additional A4B squadrons.

(2) The mobilization of three patrol squadrons (VP) would provide an adequate VP rotation base.

(3) Seventeen destroyers (DD) are available from the Naval Reserve Training (NRT) program.

c. Air Force. Mobilization could provide 20 deployable ANG tactical fighter squadrons (489 aircraft minimum) and 12 ANG tactical reconnaissance squadrons. While not nuclear capable and possessing less modern aircraft, the TFSs would partially provide for the 22 TFS shortfall anticipated. By using older equipment, shortfalls in TRSs would be reduced to zero, and the CONUS base posture improved. TCS shortfalls would be reduced through use of C-119 aircraft. Some personnel shortages would be alleviated.

d. Marine Corps. Mobilization would provide sufficient numbers of personnel for most units required for deployment. Shortfalls would continue to exist in aircraft, materiel, billets, and skills necessary for these units and for an adequate rotation and training base.

7. (TS) In conclusion, the Services cannot fully respond to CINCPAC's CY 1966 (adjusted) and CY 1967 force requirements on the time schedule he has prescribed and under the conditions stated in paragraph 4, above. Providing the preponderance of his requirements, even on a delayed schedule, would further impair the US military posture and capability to maintain forward deployments to deter aggression world-wide. It would further reduce the capability to reinforce NATO rapidly, to provide forces for other contingencies, and to maintain a sufficient rotation and training base. Mobilization of reserves, extension of terms of service, and extending overseas tours would assist in alleviating shortfalls associated with satisfying CINCPAC's requirements. Certain critical problems cannot be fully resolved by mobilization because of equipment and skill shortages. Of particular note in the case of the Army, equipment withdrawals from the Reserve components have substantially weakened the Army's reserve structure.

8. (TS) Realizing that the results of the CINCPAC capabilities conference will affect this assessment, US military posture world-wide will be reexamined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff after 20 October 1966. The results will be forwarded to you with appropriate recommendations to include additional force activations as required.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Signed

DAVID L. McDONALD
Acting Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachments

APPENDICES A, B, C, AND D

Appendix A - Table I - US Army

Annex - US Army Rationale

Appendix B - Tables I & II - US Navy

Annex - US Navy Rationale

Appendix C - Table I - US Air Force

Annex - US Air Force Rationale

Appendix D - Tables I & II - US Marine Corps

Annex - US Marine Corps Rationale

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APPENDIX A

TABLE I - US ARMY

END CY 1967 DISPOSITION OF US ARMY MAJOR ELEMENTS ASSUMING TOTAL CINCPAC CY 66 AND CY 67 FORCE REQUIREMENTS ARE MET

SEA DEPLOYMENTS END CY 1967	REMAINING FORCES 5/					ADD'L COMMITMENTS TO NATO BY M/D + 30 (MAJOR UNITS ONLY)	MAJOR FORCE DEFICIENCIES RESULTING FROM CINCPAC'S PROPOSED FORCE DEPLOYMENTS (SEE ANNEX HERETO FOR RATIONALE)
	PACOM (-)	EUCOM	STRICOM 1/	OTHER	APPROVED BUT NOT AVAILABLE		
4 Inf Div 1 AM Div	2 Inf Div	2 Armd Div 3 Mech Div	2 Armd Div 1 Mech Div 1 2/3 Abn Div			2 Armd Div 1 Mech Div	3 2/3 Inf Div 4/
2 Abn Bde 2 Inf Bde	1 Inf Bde					1 Bde	
1 Armd Cav Regt		3 Armd Cav Regt	1 Armd Cav Regt				
17 Engr Bn2/ 82 Avn Co3/	1 Engr Bn2/ 4 Avn Co3/	7 Engr Bn2/ 10 Avn Co3/	1 Engr Bn2/ 8 Avn Co3/	5 Avn Co3/	5 Engr Bn2/	8 Engr Bn2/ 7 Avn Co3/	11 Engr Bn2/ 42 Avn Co3/

1/ Five division STRAF fully reconstituted last quarter CY 68. Many combat service support units, not available but required to provide sustaining support to each combat unit when or if deployed, are not shown.

2/ Includes separate engineer combat battalions only.

3/ Includes all those separate aviation and separate aircraft-dominated company-sized units not included in Div, Bde or Regt.

4/ This figure does not include new **non-divisional CY 66 add-on or new CY 67 requirements which must be provided for new activations.**

5/ See Tab D to Annex to Appendix A for potential to reconstitute STRAF.

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ANNEX TO APPENDIX A

US ARMY RATIONALE

1. (S) General

a. The purpose of this Annex is to discuss world-wide US Army posture at end CY 1967 assuming that CINCPAC CY 1966 (adjusted) and CY 1967 requirements are essentially met but not necessarily on CINCPAC's schedule.

b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have validated for force planning purposes and budget guidance the majority of CINCPAC add-on requirements for CY 1966 and the new CY 1967 requirements for Army forces. Of the total of approximately 81,000 personnel, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have withheld or otherwise qualified validation for approximately 11,000 personnel.

c. Tabs A-D hereto display in chart form certain broad findings of the Army study, "Capability to Meet and Sustain CINCPAC Requirements (U)." Tab A summarizes activations necessary to meet deployments and reconstitute the STRAF; Tab B graphically displays these activations; Tab C compares the activation schedule for STRAF reconstitution with equipment availability. Tab D provides an estimate of the projected readiness of the STRAF. Paragraphs 2-4 below provide a discussion of the Army's analysis of its posture.

2. (S) Army Capability to Meet the Requirement

a. The Army's capability to meet the above requirements has been analyzed based on the following considerations:

(1) There will be no mobilization or extension of terms of service.

(2) There will be no end strength restrictions.

(3) Substantial withdrawal of skilled personnel from lower priority commands will be permitted. The withdrawals considered include up to 50 percent of officer requirements by branch and 80 percent of skilled enlisted requirements. The following areas are involved - Europe, Hawaii, Japan, Alaska, and CONUS commands less the training base.

(4) A rotation policy which provides 25 months in the sustaining base (long tour areas and CONUS) between short tours of 12 months.

(5) Approval of equipment withdrawals from the reserve components and pre-positioned stock will be granted.

(6) Certain units will be activated with a minimum of equipment.

b. The Army can meet CINCPAC's requirements on a time schedule which on the average is six to eight months later than CINCPAC's schedule.

3. (S) Impact of Meeting Requirements. The following summarized impacts and findings result from a recently completed Army study titled "Capability to Meet and Sustain CINCPAC Requirements (U)."

a. The Army's maximum efforts do not meet, in the time frame requested, CINCPAC stated requirements. An average delay of from six to eight months in the CINCPAC schedule will be necessary.

b. These efforts to meet CINCPAC stated requirements limit the Army's ability to reconstitute its strategic forces. For example, it will not be until the third quarter of CY 1968 that one full-division force will be available for a contingency commitment from the CONUS STRAF. Further, the STRAF will not be fully reconstituted at five divisions until the last quarter of CY 1968.

c. In order to meet the proposed deployments for the tank battalion, three tank companies, three armored cavalry squadrons and an armored cavalry troop, the NATO reinforcing divisions of the STRAF must experience an equipment and personnel drawdown.

d. The STRAF structure limitation of 231,500 falls 16,000 short of providing the force structure required. This shortage is attributable principally to an increase in school support requirements.

e. In many cases, under the proposed activation schedule, units will not be fully equipped for 18 months or more after activation. For example, a fully equipped division force could not be deployable until March 1968 and even then it would be minus certain engineer, medical and transportation support units. A second division force could not be available until August 1968.

f. Approval of authority to buy $108 million worth of new and accelerated procurement items must be granted to initially meet minimum activation requirements.

g. Similarly, withdrawal of equipment from the USAREUR theater reserve and from pre-positioning stocks would be required, leaving eight line items at zero balance. Among them would be LCM 8 landing craft, utility landing craft, 3/4-ton ambulances, 3/4-ton cargo trucks, 5-ton truck tractors, and AN/GRR-5 radio sets.

h. At the present time, of all the line items authorized the reserve components, 25 percent - 30 percent are at zero balance. Withdrawals required to meet these activations and deployments would bring to zero balance such additional major line items as boom cranes, 10-ton and 20-ton crane shovels, M-14 rifles, 600 C.F.M. compressors, bakery plants, and various items of signal equipment. The most severe impact would be felt in engineer construction units and in support units, which are equipped presently at an austere level.

i. A delay in the expansion of the active Army training base to accommodate additional Reserve Enlisted Program trainees (REPs) until after June 1967 would result in a REP backlog, at the time, of approximately 150,000. (This figure is based on the current reserve component structure and on the FY 1967 REP training input of approximately 90,000).

j. By the end of FY 1968, 52 percent of all officer assets will be lieutenants, whereas requirements call for only 36 percent of officers to be lieutenants.

k. A CONUS sustaining increment of a minimum of 78,000 is required in FY 1967 to sustain deployments to short-tour areas. Without the addition of this increment, base tours for career soldiers must be curtailed and/or experienced personnel in the higher grades in short-tour areas must be replaced with training base output.

l. Qualitative personnel drawdowns to 50 percent of authorized officer strength by branch and to 20 percent of enlisted strength by three digit MOSs will continue, where necessary, for an indefinite period in lower priority commands.

m. In order to meet aviation activations, aviators below the grade of lieutenant colonel will continue to be assigned to fill cockpit requirements. Aviator tour lengths will be limited to 12 months in the sustaining base between short tours.

n. In addition to aviators, a number of other officer, warrant officer and enlisted personnel will be receiving less than the objective base tour. For example; captains in most branches, and those individuals who possess aviation skills or engineer skills.

4. (S) World-Wide Posture, End CY 1967

a. The most significant impact of meeting CINCPAC requirements and the one which will have the greatest effect on posture is the condition of the CONUS STRAF. In order to rapidly reinforce Europe or other areas from the STRAF, the Army will have available only two airborne brigade forces throughout 1967 and for the first half of 1968. This situation is dictated by the necessity to apply total available assets to the task of sustaining deployments to Southeast Asia thus preventing the NATO reinforcing divisions (armored and mechanized) from reaching a combat-ready status until 1968.

b. The capability of the reserve components, including the selected reserve force, has also been degraded principally by equipment withdrawals (See Tab D, hereto).

Further withdrawals would be necessary if CINCPAC requirements are to be met as proposed. It is estimated that by end CY 1967 the reserve components will have zero assets in approximately 30 percent of the authorized equipment line items.

c. Thus, the reserves are at a low level of readiness at the very time greater dependence need be placed on them as a result of the degradation of the capability of the active Army. As noted above, the ability of the active Army to bridge the time gap between the initiation of an emergency and the availability of the reserves has already been reduced. A high element of risk has therefore been introduced and would be compounded by the new requirements insofar as our capability to respond to other contingencies is concerned.

d. The impact in overseas areas other than Southeast Asia, particularly Europe, will continue to be sizeable. Most significant will be the continued absence of key personnel resulting from the qualitative personnel drawdowns of 50 percent of authorized officer and 80 percent of skilled enlisted strength. These drawdowns will continue throughout 1967 and at the end of 1967 will have been in effect for over two years. In conjunction with these drawdowns will be a degradation in experience level. For example, by end FY 1968, 52 percent of all officer assets will be lieutenants while requirements call for only 36 percent of officers to be lieutenants.

e. The Army can maintain unit deployments world-wide with the following impacts:

(1) USAREUR strength will be restored by bulk fill by end CY 1966, but command effectiveness would continue to be at a reduced level because of the qualitative personnel drawdowns.

(2) In USARAL, the two maneuver battalions withdrawn in 1966 cannot be replaced before end CY 1967.

(3) The forces deployed in USARSOUTHCOM and in Korea would have personnel deficiencies similar to those of USAREUR.

(4) The Army part of the PACOM reserve will be limited to one brigade in Hawaii.

5. (TS) Mobilization of Army Reserve Components

a. This review of the impact of a mobilization of reserve components examines two areas:

(1) The extent to which a mobilization would permit acceleration of certain deployments, which are now required to be slipped as much as six to eight months from CINCPAC's schedule.

(2) The extent to which a mobilization would improve the posture of the sustaining base, including the STRAF, throughout CY 1967.

b. A basic consideration is that the mobilization of reserve units would not relieve the fundamental problem: namely, a shortage of numerous items of equipment which are mission essential. The Army has identified 40 such items of equipment for which new procurement is required and 10 additional items for which expedited delivery of programmed buys is necessary. These same items of equipment have already been withdrawn from the reserve components.

c. The effect of the foregoing is that mobilization of reserve component units would not assist in accelerating deployments in order to more closely meet CINCPAC's requirements schedule. Mobilization of certain types of units, however, could assist in restoring readiness of the STRAF more rapidly. Designated units could be called to active duty and -- through pooling and sharing of equipment -- accomplish the necessary training despite individual unit shortages. Upon receipt of the equipment, they could quickly be ready for contingency use.

d. Reserve mobilization could provide increased assistance in restoration of the STRAF and, to a lesser extent, permit acceleration of deployments if it were accompanied by controls or mobilization measures applied to the industrial base. Suggestive of the type measures required is the problem of 2½-ton truck production. Availability of 2½-ton trucks is, in some cases, a limiting factor in supporting activations. However, industry is reluctant to accept contracts for delivery of vehicles within the time frame required. Of particular concern is the availability of axle sets, malleable steel, and copper products. Consequently, 2½-ton truck production has been accelerated to the level industry is willing to accept under present circumstances. An indication of the range of production rates attainable, dependent upon the extent of controls applied, is provided at Tab E. This chart depicts production rates from normal through maximum with industrial mobilization for ten items which currently are at zero balance in the reserve components.

e. In the short run, the asset existing in the reserves which is currently required and which can only be made available through selective mobilization is personnel possessing skills now in seriously short supply in the active Army. As of 31 December 1966 the acquisition of approximately 25,000 experienced officers and enlisted men possessing critical military occupation specialties (MOS) -- 16 officer branch/grades and 29 enlisted MOSs -- would alleviate the critical shortages in these areas in the active Army at that point in time. The reserve components are capable of meeting the major part of these requirements, except for aviators and other aviation personnel, communications and water transportation specialists, nurses, and medical personnel.

f. Selective mobilization of individual reservists would assist primarily to fill skill and supervisory deficiencies in the deploying units and in the sustaining base, including STRAF. However, activations of infantry units and some aviation and specialized engineer units, for which the governing limitation is now personnel rather than equipment, could be accelerated if reserve component specialist personnel were called to active duty and if the necessary equipment could be made comparably available. Determination of the extent to which this might be desirable would require CINCPAC review of the desirability of deploying maneuver units without associated support units since accelerated deployment of the latter is not possible.

6. (TS) Force Deficiencies

a. By JCSM 130-66, dated 1 March 1966, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed the then stated CINCPAC requirements and identified an Army force deficiency of four divisions in the STRAF. Since 1 March 1966, there have been no activations which would correct this STRAF deficiency -- and correspondingly improve the sustaining base -- nor have the conditions changed on which the requirements were based. On the contrary, many of the problems continue and will be compounded in preparing to meet CY 1967 requirements. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as stated on 1 March 1966, are therefore considered to be valid, except that the deficiency should be stated as three and two-thirds division forces rather than the four-division forces identified. This difference is explained by the desire of the Army to use one of the three temporary brigades authorized on 28 July 1965 as the initial brigade of a PACOM reserve division.

b. By way of review, the rationale for the new division forces, as expressed in JCSM 130-66, is based on:

(1) The need to reduce the risk inherent in a prolonged delay in reconstituting the STRAF.

(2) Requirements to sustain deployed units through the provision of a sufficient training and rotation base.

(3) Possible requirements for additional deployments to the Republic of Vietnam.

c. The sustaining base analysis which was a part of the Army's study on "Capability to Meet and Sustain CINCPAC Requirements" indicates that deployments to Southeast Asia can be sustained only by continuing to accept tour lengths in Europe and the CONUS of 25 months and by provision of additional spaces for the CONUS sustaining increment. Those additional spaces must be provided to the CONUS to permit "on the job" training for newly acquired personnel assets and for skill progression. Based on the original CINCPAC requirements and deployment schedule, it is estimated that approximately 76,000 CONUS spaces above those presently authorized would be required to sustain deployments throughout 1967. It is emphasized that these are raw spaces -- that is, they have not been assigned to units. The analysis further shows that with a total strength add-on of approximately 115,900 (76,000 plus roundout) the current requirement can be met by space increases to existing units plus limited small unit activations. Significant, however, is the fact that activation of a two division force would provide the necessary spaces within a total strength add-on only approximately 20 percent higher than the 115,900 figure. Thus, for a 20 percent difference we would not only meet the sustaining increment requirement but also would gain a two division deployable force providing necessary equipment were available. While subsequent slippages in deployments (from the CINCPAC time schedule) have altered the 76,000 figure, the principle of economic satisfaction of the CONUS Sustaining Increment by activation of new division forces remains valid.

d. On 1 July 1966, a strength of 231,500 was authorized for the five division forces remaining in CONUS following completion of currently approved deployments. The actual strength of the STRAF on 1 July 1966 (not including units to be deployed) was 119,800 and much of that figure represents untrained strength. Two significant impacts should be identified.

(1) The capability to deploy STRAF units is extremely limited. While selected combat units could be deployed to Europe or Southeast Asia, there are insufficient combat support and combat service support units to support STRAF deployments elsewhere. It is estimated that the STRAF will not be reconstituted at the 231,500 figure until the last quarter of CY 1968.

(2) The residual STRAF with a strength of approximately 119,800 cannot, at this time, sustain currently planned deployments. In short, units are being deployed at a faster rate than the sustaining base is being built.

e. Meeting the material requirements for the CY 1966 and CY 1967 add-on forces for Southeast Asia when added to the unprogrammed requirements -- such as the Army operation of the Saigon Port, and modernization of the ROKA equipment -- would further aggravate shortages for Army forces elsewhere until approximately the end FY 1968. (These shortages could be alleviated by that time provided early FY 1967 approval was given for accelerated procurement and fund availability for equipment necessary to meet new activations and replacement of added combat consumption.) Equipment for PACOM deployments and reconstitution of the STRAF could generally be fulfilled but not within the proposed deployment schedule. There will be delays in equipping units such as engineer construction battalions, well drilling detachments, quarrying units, signal units, transportation corps medium truck companies, and quartermaster refrigeration detachments which would be required to support combat units.

f. An accelerated procurement program which has been initiated, together with the normal procurement actions, will partially reduce the logistic limitations for support of currently approved forces. Most equipment for units approved for activation and for priority unprogrammed requirements could be provided by further drawdown or diversion of equipment from already approved forces with a lower priority for deployments. However, this would result in these approved units not being available as scheduled.

g. Since the activations recommended on 1 March 1966 have not been approved, the point has been reached where a contingency requiring several divisions will dictate a mobilization of sufficient magnitude to permit meeting both the contingency requirements and the sustaining base requirements. This could mean a phased mobilization of five to six divisions in order to deploy a force of two to three divisions. Activation of four division would, for the most part, alleviate the problems of the sustaining base and permit reconstitution of the STRAF. In order to activate four divisions, prompt action to obtain additional funding and accelerated procurement authorization required to provide the necessary equipment would be essential. Although not in the immediate time frame, this action would permit the earliest reconstitution of the STRAF to meet operational planning commitments and thereby reduce the risk to the nation in carrying out the strategy outlined in JCSM 721-65, dated 24 September 1965, subject: "US Military Posture (U)."

TAB A, APPENDIX A

ACTIVATIONS FOR DEPLOYMENTS TO SEA AND RECONSTITUTION OF STRAF AT 5 DIVISIONS

ACTIVATE IN	TO MEET	JANUARY Units	JANUARY Strength	FEBRUARY Units	FEBRUARY Strength	MARCH Units	MARCH Strength	APRIL Units	APRIL Strength	MAY Units	MAY Strength	JUNE Units	JUNE Strength	JULY Units	JULY Strength	AUGUST Units	AUGUST Strength	SEPTEMBER Units	SEPTEMBER Strength	OCTOBER Units	OCTOBER Strength	NOVEMBER Units	NOVEMBER Strength	DECEMBER Units	DECEMBER Strength	TOTAL Units	TOTAL Strength
1966	CY 66 DEPLOYMENTS													78	12,227	21	3,175	25	2,691	18	3,647	47	4,084	68	5,095	257	30,919
	CY 66 ADD-ON & CY 67 REQ FOR RVN															1	395	27	1,380	27	1,058	33	847	10	714	98	4,594
	CY 66 ADD-ON & CY 67 OTHER THAN RVN													1	194			9	65	1	25					11	284
	STRAF RECONSTITUTION													30	5,865	21	3,813	11	567	17	447	22	366	35	2,761	136	13,819
	TOTAL													109	18,286	43	7,383	72	4,703	63	5,177	102	5,297	117	9,303	502	49,616
1967	CY 66 DEPLOYMENTS	35	3,809	11	1,843	17	2,879	3	440	6	1,231	12	576	3	120	15	2,395	6	374	11	929	1	24	7	248	127	15,068
	CY 66 ADD-ON & CY 67 REQ FOR RVN	8	210	11	1,169	24	4,691	21	6,673	92	14,705	52	9,175	15	4,742	29	5,573	13	2,868	9	1,855	7	1,629			281	53,290
	CY 66 ADD-ON & CY 67 OTHER THAN RVN			2	28			2	107	4	248	5	765	1	7	7	1,172	8	411	11	1,572					40	4,310
	STRAF RECONSTITUTION	15	1,167	39	1,508	41	10,740	73	14,619	50	8,104	50	4,854	51	7,874	29	6,042	17	2,256	36	7,139	23	4,074	57	12,357	481	80,734
	TOTAL	58	5,186	63	4,548	82	18,310	99	21,839	152	24,288	119	15,370	70	12,743	80	15,382	44	5,909	67	11,495	31	5,727	64	12,605	929	153,402
1968	CY 66 DEPLOYMENTS	2	700	1	115			7	1,995			1	184													11	2,996
	CY 66 ADD-ON & CY 67 REQ FOR RVN	3	277	3	1,040	3	813	1	350			15	6,876													25	9,356
	CY 66 ADD-ON & CY 67 OTHER THAN RVN	1	11	2	362	1	59	1	7			1	32													6	471
	STRAF RECONSTITUTION	6	1,282	11	1,717	8	1,791	16	1,625	10	5,305	33	12,541	17	4,503					3	232	12	1,892	7	1,217	123	32,105
	TOTAL	12	2,270	17	3,234	12	2,663	25	3,977	10	5,305	50	19,633	17	4,503					3	232	12	1,892	7	1,217	165	44,926
1969	CY 66 DEPLOYMENTS					2	48	3	543																	5	591
	CY 66 ADD-ON & CY 67 REQ FOR RVN	1	79																							1	79
	CY 66 ADD-ON & CY 67 OTHER THAN RVN																										
	STRAF RECONSTITUTION	7	862			1	753			1	753					1	171									10	2,539
	TOTAL	8	941			3	801	3	543	1	753					1	171									16	3,209

RECAPITULATION	TOTAL Unit	TOTAL Strength	FY 1967 Unit	FY 1967 Strength	FY 1968 Unit	FY 1968 Strength	FY 1969 Unit	FY 1969 Strength	FY 1970 Unit	FY 1970 Strength
CY 66 DEPLOYMENTS	400	49,572	341	41,697	54	7,254	5	591		
CY 66 ADD-ON & CY 67 REQ FOR RVN	405	67,319	306	41,217	98	26,023	1	79		
CY 66 ADD-ON & CY 67 OTHER THAN RVN	57	5,065	24	1,432	33	3,633				
STRAF RECONSTITUTION	750	129,197	404	54,811	297	64,003	48	10,212	1	171
TOTAL	1612	251,153	1075	139,157	482	100,943	54	10,882	1	171

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ACTIVATIONS FOR STRAF AND SOUTHEAST ASIA



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TAB C, APPENDIX A

RECONSTITUTION OF STRAF AT FIVE DIVISION FORCES

(Data from Army Study: Capability to Meet and Sustain CINCPAC Requirements (U)")



TAB D TO APPENDIX A

ESTIMATE OF EFFECTIVENESS OF STRAF AND PRIORITY RESERVE FORCES
(Based on Gross Factoring of the Impact of Implementation of Army Study,
"Capability to Meet and Sustain CINCPAC Requirements (U)")
Figures Indicate Weeks to Become Operationally Ready1/

DIVISIONS, INDEPENDENT BDES, AND SUPPORTING INCREMENTS		1 30 Jun 66	2 31 Dec 66	3 30 Jun 67	4 31 Dec 67	5 30 Jun 68	6 31 Dec 68
ACTIVE							
82d Abn Div	1 Bde	2	2				
	2 Bde	2	2	2	2	2	2
	3 Bde	26+	8				
	1/3	2	2	2	2	2	
ISI	1/3		52+	26+			2
	1/3			52+	26+	8	
SSI				52+	26+	8	2
101st Abn Div (-1 Bde)	1 Bde	26+	2	2	2	2	2
	2 Bde	26+	12				
2/3 ISI				52+	26+	8	2
2/3 SSI				52+	26+	12	2
1st Armd Div		52+	52+	52+	26+	8	2
ISI					52+	26+	2
SSI2/							
2d Armd Div		52+	52+	52+	26+	8	2
ISI					52+	26+	2
SSI2/							
5th Inf Div (M)		52+	52+	52+	26+	8	2
ISI					52+	26+	2
SSI2/							
11th Inf Bde		26+	12	2	2	2	2
ISI				52+	26+	12	2
SSI				52+	26+	12	2
PRIORITY RESERVE 3/							
26th Inf Div		52+	52+	52+	52+	52+	52+
ISI							52+
SSI							52+
28th Inf Div		52+	52+	52+	52+	52+	26+
ISI						52+	26+
SSI						52+	26+
30th Inf Div*		52+	52+	52+	52+	52+	52+
ISI							52+
SSI							52+
38th Inf Div		52+	52+	52+	52+	52+	26+
ISI						52+	26+
SSI						52+	26+
42d Inf Div		52+	52+	52+	52+	52+	52+
ISI							52+
SSI							52+
47th Inf Div		52+	52+	52+	52+	52+	26+
ISI						52+	26+
SSI						52+	26+
29, 67, 69 Inf Bdes		12	52+	52+	52+	26+	12+
ISI		12	52+	52+	52+	26+	12+
SSI		12	52+	52+	52+	26+	12+
30th Armd Div		52+	52+	52+	52+	52+	52+
ISI							52+
SSI							52+
50th Armd Div		52+	52+	52+	52+	52+	52+
ISI							52+
SSI							52+
SSIs (3 for NATO Reinforcing Divisions)2/					52+	26+	12

* Converts to 30th Inf Div (M) by 30 Jun 67.

NOTE: For display purposes only, ISIs and SSIs are grouped with divisions and independent brigades or shown separately in the Reserves. Actually, ISIs and SSIs are not earmarked for deployment with a specific division.

1/ An estimate of the time required to ready forces for deployment.

2/ SSIs for the 3 NATO reinforcing divs are provided from Reserves. Equipment for these SSIs, however, is included as a part of the Div Force Equip Set.

3/ Readiness of Reserve forces is constrained by availability of equipment.

TAB E TO APPENDIX A

EQUIPMENT PRODUCTION SCHEDULE

(Normal and industrial mobilization deliveries of certain items now at zero balance in the Reserve Components)

LINE NO.	ITEM	NORMAL PRODUCTION LEAD TIME (MONTHS)	REORDER[1] PRODUCTION LEAD TIME (MONTHS)	NORMAL UNIT PRODUCTION PER MONTH[2]	ACCELERATED PRODUCTION PER MONTH[3]	MAXIMUM PRODUCTION PER MONTH[4]	MONTHS TO ACHIEVE MAX PRODUCTION FROM NORMAL PRODUCTION	TOTAL RESERVE REQM'T	TOTAL REQM'T MET[5]
1	ARMORED VEHICLE LAUNCHED BRIDGE (AVLB)	12	10	(30)[6]	(360)[6]	(500)[6]	17	287	8/
2	CRANE, WHL-MTD, 20-TON, ROUGH TERRAIN	17	8	80	120	144	12	519	FY70
3	CRANE SHOVEL, 12½ TON, CRAWLER	11	6	35	70	100	12	140	FY68
4	COMBAT ENGINEER VEHICLE	12	10	(6/)	(6/)	(6/)	17	95	9/
5	RECOVERY VEHICLE FT ARMORED M578	14	12	86	171	255	10	447	FY68
6	RIFLE, RECOILLESS 90mm M67	12	10	180	335	542	11	3238	10/
7	TRUCK, FORK LIFT, DED PNEU TIRES, RT, 10,000lbs	17	10	60	100	120	7	258	FY69
8	RADAR SET PPS 5 (SUB FOR AN/TRS-33 & PPS4)	24	10	20	33	50	12	1422	FY70
9	RADIO SET AN/PRC 25	19	9	1850	2450	3000	7	25202	11/
10	HELICOPTER, UH-1B/D	20	17	44	79	150	0[7]	1191	FY68

[1] Applicable to hot base.

[2] One 8-hr work shift, 5 days per week.

[3] Two 8-hr work shifts, 5 days per week.

[4] Full industrial mobilization.

[5] Assumes normal production only.

[6] Figures in parentheses indicate production of tank chassis fundamental to this item, which is currently limited by OSD to 30 per month. Figures shown for accelerated and maximum production assume removal of this constraint. Any entry in line 4 must be deleted from line 1.

[7] Currently in production at maximum rate.

[8] D/A staff has limited procurement to Active Army requirements pending availability of MBT-70 chassis.

[9] D/A staff has limited procurement to Active Army requirements pending availability of CEV on MBT-70 chassis.

[10] D/A staff has limited procurement pending introduction of MAW missile system; 3.5" RL is temp substitute

[11] Entire requirement will be modernized by FY 71; AN/PRCs 8,9, and 10 will be used in interim, with selective phased modernization to assure some degree of readiness.

TAB F TO APPENDIX A
SUMMARY OF U.S. ARMY FORCES (U)

Figures Indicate Force Availability in Weeks 1/
(See assumptions below for significance of entries)

	HISTORICAL		PROJECTED:	Assumes full mobilization on effective dates shown	
DFE (DIV or BDE+ISI+SSI)	1 30 Jun 65	2 30 Jun 66	3 31 Dec 66	4 30 Jun 67	5 30 Jun 68
ACTIVE - SEA					
173d Abn Bde	2	2	2	2	2
101st Abn Bde	8	2	2	2	2
1st Inf Div	8	2	2	2	2
4th Inf Div	8	2	2	2	2
9th Inf Div		12+	2	2	2
25th Inf Div	2	2	2	2	2
196th Inf Bde		2	2	2	2
199th Inf Bde		12+	2	2	2
1st Cav Div (Aml)	2	2	2	2	2
ACTIVE - OTHER					
(Bde	2	2	2	2	2
82d Abn Div (Bde	2	12	8	8	8
(Bde	2	12	8	8	8
101st Abn Div (- 1 Bde)	8	12	8	8	8
2d Inf Div	12+	12	8	8	8
7th Inf Div	12+	12	8	8	8
11th Inf Bde			8	8	8
3d Inf Div (M)	2	12	8	8	2
5th Inf Div (M)	8	12+	12+	8	8
8th Inf Div (M)	2	12	8	8	2
24th Inf Div (M)	2	12	8	8	2
1st Armd Div	8	12+	12+	8	8
2d Armd Div	8	12+	12+	8	8
3d Armd Div	2	12	8	8	2
4th Armd Div	2	12	8	8	2
PRIORITY RESERVE			2/	2/	3/
26th Inf Div	12+	12+	12+	12+	12+
28th Inf Div	12+	12+	12+	12	12
30th Inf Div (M)		12+	12+	12+	12+
38th Inf Div	12+	12+	12+	12+	12
42d Inf Div		12+	12+	12+	12+
47th Inf Div	12+	12+	12+	12+	12
29, 67, 69 Inf Bdes		12+	12+	12	8
30th Armd Div	12+	12+	12+	12+	12+
50th Armd Div	12+	12+	12+	12+	12+
DIV FORCE EQUIP SETS DELIVERED	$15\frac{1}{3}$	$17\frac{1}{3}$	17 4/	$19\frac{2}{3}$	$22\frac{1}{3}$

	1 ACTUAL 30 Jun 65	2 ACTUAL 30 Jun 66	3 PROGRAMMED 31 Dec 66	4 PROGRAMMED 30 Jun 67	5 PROGRAMMED 30 Jun 68
STRENGTHS (in 1000's)					
ACTIVE					
Trained	880.8	1010.2	1182.6	1327.8	1326.0
Trainees in Units		21.4	11.2		
Trainees in Centers	87.5	167.4	191.5	139.2	164.0
Subtotal	968.3	1199.0	1385.3	1467.0 5/	1490.0 5/
RESERVE					
Priority Reserve 6/	442.9	552.8	688.5 7/	688.5 7/	688.5 7/
Other Paid Drill 8/	197.8	119.1			
Obligated Fillers-RRMRP	412.0	507.8	510.0	517.0	682.0
Subtotal	1052.7	1179.7	1198.5	1205.5	1370.5
TOTAL	2021.0	2378.7	2584.9	2672.5	2860.5

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~~NOTES~~

1/ "Force Availability in Weeks" is the time required to provide the Div + ISI + SSI for deployment. For deployed units, it is the time required to field the Div + ISI + SSI. Actual availability for combat or combat efficiency may be less than desired due to reduced training times for fillers and for Reserve units. Actual deployment may require some additional time, dependent upon disposition of units, availability and type of transport and other factors. Round out of active Army ISI and SSI required from Reserves:

31 Dec 66 - 5 2/3 ISI: 1 1/3 Korea, 1 1/3 Abn, 3 NATO Div
- 6 2/3 SSI: 1 1/3 Korea, 1 Europe, 3 NATO Div, 1 1/3 Abn
30 Jun 67 - 5 1/3 ISI: 1 1/3 Korea, 1 Abn, 3 NATO Div
- 6 1/3 SSI: 1 1/3 Korea, 1 Abn, 3 NATO Div, 1 Europe
30 Jun 68 - 1 1/3 ISI: 1 1/3 Korea
- 5 1/3 SSI: 1 1/3 Korea, 1 Europe, 3 NATO Div

2/ Reserves availability constrained by lack of balanced structure ISI and SSI due to drawdown for active Army ISI and SSI, and availability of equipment.

3/ Non-SRF division force availability constrained by equipment. Because of priority of personnel and equipment for SRF units, non-SRF units will not be available in prior to 12+ weeks until FY 70.

4/ Reduction in equipment sets from 17 1/3 on 30 Jun 66 to 17 on 31 Dec 66 is due to expansion of requirements; e.g., CONUS training base, OCS, and SEA requirements and temporary units.

5/ Reflects guidance contained in 15 Aug 66 draft SECDEF Presidential Memo.

6/ Includes SRF, on-site air defense, and remainder of the Immediate Reserve.

7/ Strength and composition of the Reserve Components are subject to adjustment as may be required by pending legislation, or as a result of considerations currently underway in OSD in coordination with the Army staff.

8/ Reinforcing Reserve.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS:

A. Full mobilization will be ordered to include extension of terms of service effective on 31 Dec 66, 30 Jun 67, and 30 Jun 68.

B. The entire Reserve Forces resources, personnel and equipment, including standard A, B, and C&T assets are applied.

C. All worldwide equipment assets are distributed to permit deployment of maximum division forces without consideration of the time-space factors to accomplish these redistribution actions.

D. CINCPAC CY 66 requirements and add-ons and CY 67 requirements will be in execution on each selected date: 31 Dec 66, 30 Jun 67, and 30 Jun 68. (Additional requirements will affect chart.)

E. STRAF units activated and/or preparing for deployment to SEA are available for deployment elsewhere as required.

F. Overseas tours for all personnel are extended and personnel previously programmed for overseas replacements, except for casualties, become available for reassignment.

G. Sustaining support increments (SSI) are not required to deploy until 60 days after Div and ISI deployments. SSI for the three NATO-oriented divisions are provided by Reserves.

H. An intensified combat training program will be used to ready all units for deployment.

I. Reserve Forces deployability is based on Intensified Combat Training Program and includes 1 week for alert, 1 week for move to mobilization station, and 2 weeks for preparation for overseas movement (POM).

J. Average division force strengths are 50.0 (Div - 16.0, ISI - 16.0-20.0, SSI - 13.0-16.0); brigade is 15.0 (Bde - 4.0, ISI - 6.0, SSI - 5.0). Div + ISI + SSI are included.

K. Current Europe strength is equated to 5 Div + 5 ISI + 4 SSI; current Korea strength to 2 Div + 2/3 ISI + 2/3 SSI.

L. Adequate facilities at mobilization stations will be available for Reserve Forces.

APPENDIX B

TABLE I - US NAVY

REVIEW OF CERTAIN US MILITARY FORCES ASSUMING TOTAL CINCPAC CY 66 AND CY 67 FORCE REQUIREMENTS ARE MET

WESTERN PACIFIC DEPLOYMENTS END CY 1966	REMAINING FORCES					ADD'L COMMITMENTS TO NATO BY M/D + 30 (MAJOR UNITS ONLY) (Category B)	MAJOR FORCE DEFICIENCIES RESULTING FROM CINCPAC'S PROPOSED FORCE DEPLOYMENTS (SEE ANNEX HERETO FOR RATIONALE)
	PACOM	EUCOM	LANTCOM	OTHER	APPROVED BUT NOT AVAILABLE		
6 CVA/CVW	5 CVA/CVW	1 CVA/CVW	3 CVA/CVW			4 CVA/CVW	1 CVS (MOD), 1 Training Carrier, 12 VA, Training Aircraft, 24 DD, 3 VP
1 CVS	3 CVS		4 CVS			3 CVS	
3 CA/CAG/CLG	5 CA/CAG/CLG	2 CA/CAG/CLG	4 CA/CAG/CLG			4 CA/CAG/CLG	
55 DD	73 DD	12 DD	93 DD			28 DD	NOTE: The following combatant ships are deployed from LANTCOM/EUCOM to PACOM: 2 CVA/CVW, 15 DD, 1 VP
6½ VP Sqdns	10½ VP Sqdns	2 VP Sqdns	12 VP Sqdns			8 VP Sqdns	

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APPENDIX B

TABLE II - US NAVY

REVIEW OF CERTAIN US MILITARY FORCES ASSUMING TOTAL CINCPAC CY 66 AND CY 67 FORCE REQUIREMENTS ARE MET

WESTERN PACIFIC DEPLOYMENTS END CY 1967	REMAINING FORCES					ADD'L COMMITMENTS TO NATO BY M/D + 30 (MAJOR UNITS ONLY) (Category B)	MAJOR FORCE DEFICIENCIES RESULTING FROM CINCPAC'S PROPOSED FORCE DEPLOYMENTS (SEE ANNEX HERETO FOR RATIONALE)
	PACOM	EUCOM	LANTCOM	OTHER	APPROVED BUT NOT AVAILABLE		
6 CVA/CVW	5 CVA/CVW	1 CVA/CVW	3 CVA/CVW			6 CVA/CVW	1 CVS (MOD), 1 Training Carrier, 12 VA, Training Aircraft, 40 DD, 3 VP
1 CVS	3 CVS		4 CVS			4 CVS	
3 CA/CAG/CLG	6 CA/CAG/CLG	1 CA/CAG/CLG	4 CA/CAG/CLG			4 CA/CAG/CLG	
63 DD	72 DD	12 DD	86 DD			50 DD	NOTE: The following combatant ships are deployed from LANTCOM/EUCOM to PACOM: 2 CVA/CVW, 23 DD, 1 VP
6½ VP Sqdns	10½ VP Sqdns	2 VP Sqdns	12 VP Sqdns			8 VP Sqdns	

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ANNEX TO APPENDIX B

US NAVY RATIONALE

1. (TS) General

a. To support operations in Southeast Asia, SEVENTH Fleet force levels have increased in the following categories as follows:

	Fall 1964	Fall 1966	End 1967 (proposed)
Attack Carriers (CVA)	3	5	6
Cruisers	2	3	3
Destroyers (DD)	32	48	61
Amphibious	23	29	29
Ammunition Ships (AE)	6	10	11
Patrol Squadrons (VP)	5½	6½	6½

b. The Atlantic Fleet now supplies one and two-tenths equivalent CVA, eight DD, one VP, and one AE in the Western Pacific to assist in alleviating the impact of the increased deployments upon the Pacific Fleet.

c. The additional Navy forces required in CINCPAC's adjusted CY 1966 requirements, to be deployed to the Western Pacific, include one CVA, three cruisers or frigates, and four DD. The additional CY 1967 forces include one heavy cruiser, eight DD, one amphibious assault ship (LPH), one dock landing ship (LSD) and one AE. Excluding mobilization or the activation or procurement of additional assets, these forces could only be supplied by diverting LANTCOM/EUCOM assets to PACOM.

d. The following paragraphs discuss each ship type, the aircraft and aircrew situation, and the impact upon CINCLANT and USCINCEUR resulting from the dislocation of additional forces.

2. (TS) Attack Carriers (CVAs)

a. The present CVA schedule is a coordinated one utilizing PACOM/LANTCOM assets to provide the SEVENTH Fleet requirement of five CVAs and the EUCOM requirement of two CVAs.

b. The principal deleterious effects of deploying a sixth CVA to the SEVENTH Fleet are as follows:

(1) For purposes of morale, optimum maintenance, and overhaul and training schedules, the desired policy is a one-in-three rotation (six months deployed, one year turnaround). The deployment and turnaround times presently being experienced which reflect the increased deployment intensity of CVAs are:

	Deployed (mos)	Turnaround (mos)
PAC	7.1	5.1
LANT/MED	8.1	6.1
LANT/PAC	7.8	5.6

(2) Extended intervals between overhauls. PACFLT averages 40 months and LANTFLT averages 47 months. The programmed operating interval between overhauls is 35 months.

(3) Requires periodic deployment of LANTFLT carriers to the SEVENTH Fleet. The present proposed schedule is:

INTREPID (CVS-11) (Operating in a limited CVA role)	Apr 1966 - Nov 1966 Apr 1967 - Dec 1967 May 1968 - Jan 1969
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT (CVA-42)	Jun 1966 - Feb 1967
FORRESTAL (CVA-59)	Jun 1967 - Feb 1968
AMERICA (CVA-66)	Apr 1968 - Dec 1968

(4) Extensive upkeep after each deployment (averages an additional two months).

c. If LANTFLT is directed to deploy an additional CVA to SEVENTH Fleet during CY 1966, the least undesirable alternative would be to withdraw CVA assets from EUCOM.

d. In order to maintain an adequate training and rotation base, 17 CVAs could provide for the continuous deployment of seven CVAs for extended periods under conditions short of general war and/or mobilization. With a current force level of 15 CVA/CVW, a shortfall of two CVA/CVW (attack carrier/attack carrier air wing) exists. The next new construction CVA (JOHN F. KENNEDY) will become operational during FY 3/69. This shortfall has been partially alleviated by utilizing, as an interim measure, a CVS (INTREPID) modified and operating in a limited attack role. It could be further alleviated by modifying and operating another CVS (LEXINGTON) in a limited attack role. However, it would take at least 12 to 18 months to carry out this decision as a CVS now in the Naval Reserve Fleet (NRF) would have to be activated and modified to replace the LEXINGTON as the Naval Air Training Command training carrier.

3. (TS) Aircrews

a. Deployment of a sixth CVA to the Western Pacific to provide an additional 18 carrier days per month on YANKEE station would aggravate the already critical aircrew situation. With two CVAs in the Mediterranean and five in Southeast Asia, the Mediterranean CVAs may be used as a noncombat deployment on a 2/5 basis. With only one in the Mediterranean and six in Southeast Asia, the ratio of 1/6 would reduce this substantially. Ships squadrons, and individuals are rotated between LANTCOM and PACOM to equalize combat exposure and spread combat experience. Since July 1965, with five CVAs deployed to the Western Pacific, the Navy pilot rotation plan has reduced the number of pilots who leave VF/VA squadrons without a combat tour from 40 to 14 percent, and this figure will be further reduced. Additionally, a policy of a maximum limit of two combat tours has been placed on the VF/VA pilots. This limit is met without greatly increasing readiness attack carrier air wing (RCVW) pilot training requirements by sending pilots to the Mediterranean for their other sea duty after or between two combat tours. The proposed action (six CVAs deployed to the Western Pacific) would increase the total number of pilots making combat tours in Southeast Asia by 20 percent. RCVW and training command requirements would increase. The pilot-to-seat ratio in Southeast Asia squadrons is being kept higher than squadrons in the Mediterranean, with further increases in the pilot-to-seat ratio in Southeast Asia and further decreases in the Mediterranean being planned. The sixth CVA in support of operations would cause extra RCVW requirements. The total increased RCVW requirement would be approximately 150 pilots annually.

b. The only immediately available source of pilots to man new squadrons, increase the pilot-to-seat ratio in fighter and attack squadrons, and provide additional Carrier Readiness Air Wing (CRAW) instructors is from the Naval Air Reserve. There are 396 attack and 121 fighter pilots, fleet qualified, in that program now. If possible, all the attack pilots and fighter pilots would be called to active duty, and this would provide the complement for an additional 12 attack squadrons and alleviate the pilot shortage by approximately 5 percent.

c. For the three additional patrol squadrons (VP) there is an adequate number of pilots within the Naval Air Reserve to man three VP squadrons gained within the active structure from the assets of squadrons which transition to new models.

4. (TS) Aircraft

a. Another major effect is upon aircraft. This is a cumulative effect of past actions as well as the proposed action. Losses have not been replaced and production is not matching attrition. As a result of combat damage, a 7000-mile logistic train, and priority of effort devoted to the support of combat forces, the number of aircraft in the pipeline has increased markedly. Additional aircraft are required to train more pilots, to replace combat losses and provide higher pilot-to-seat ratios. Based on present rates, the 1,440 additional sorties provided by the sixth CVA will result in an estimated additional 51 aircraft lost per year in combat and an additional eight in major repair as a result of combat damage. Additionally, about 50 aircraft must be assigned to the RCVWs to train the additional pilots required. Assuming a pipeline of 15 percent of the 50 additional operating aircraft in the RCVW, the total initial requirement in terms of new aircraft procurement approximates 117. Thereafter, there will be an additional annual requirement of 54 aircraft.

b. Twelve additional attack squadrons are required to provide the assets for the two attack air groups (four squadrons each for the modified CVSs), and to fill the gaps created by squadrons which are in transition to new model aircraft. This latter action will allow attack squadrons to approximate a six-by-six deployment intensity. Nine squadrons are available within the Naval Air Reserve, the assets of two transitioned active squadrons will be available in early 1967, and the remaining squadron could be formed in mid-1967 from another transition. If mobilization were not authorized, the twelve squadrons and their aircrew complements could be available by 1968.

5. (TS) Heavy Cruiser (CA/CAG)

a. CINCPAC has stated a requirement for a third heavy (8-inch gun) cruiser in PACOM in order to maintain one continuously in the Western Pacific to provide heavy caliber gunfire support (GFS) and shore bombardment in North and South Vietnam. Presently there are two such cruisers assigned to PACOM.

b. The alternatives available to satisfy this requirement are the transfer of one CA/CAG from LANTCOM to PACOM, the deployment of an Atlantic Fleet heavy cruiser to the Western Pacific from March to September 1967, or the activation of a heavy cruiser from the Naval Reserve Fleet (this would require approximately 11 months). The one-time deployment of an Atlantic Fleet cruiser is the preferred alternative.

6. (TS) Destroyers/Frigates (DD/DDG/DLG/DLGN)

a. In addition to a destroyer squadron presently being continuously maintained in the Western Pacific by the Atlantic Fleet, CINCPAC has stated a CY 1966 requirement for an additional four destroyers for the sixth attack carrier strike group and eight destroyers in CY 1967 to provide a greater capability for Naval Gunfire Support (GFS) in North and South Vietnam.

b. The Pacific Fleet maintains 40 destroyers in the SEVENTH Fleet out of an inventory of 112. Eight Additional destroyers are provided by the Atlantic Fleet. The Pacific Fleet requires 136 destroyers to maintain the SEVENTH Fleet level at 48. With the additional eight required in 1967, the Pacific Fleet would require an inventory of 152 destroyers. This identifies a deficiency of 40 destroyers in the Pacific Fleet in 1967. The alternative is to rotate an additional destroyer squadron from the Atlantic Fleet.

c. It is anticipated that if the sixth attack carrier is provided the SEVENTH Fleet, the four destroyers required in connection with it would also be provided from Atlantic Fleet assets.

d. If it is determined that the Pacific Fleet destroyer force level should be raised, there are 17 destroyers available from the Naval Reserve Training Program, and the additional 23 could be activated in one year's time from the Naval Reserve Fleet.

7. (TS) Patrol Squadrons (VP)

a. The Pacific Fleet maintains five and one-half VP squadrons deployed from a rotation base of 15 squadrons and the Atlantic Fleet provides one squadron continuously deployed (on a rotational basis) to the Pacific Fleet for a total of six and one-half squadrons deployed within PACOM. Eighteen squadrons are required to continuously deploy six and one-half squadrons. The aircraft for three additional squadrons could be available by the end CY 1966 by retaining the assets of three squadrons as newer models (P-3 ORION) phase-in as replacements. There are also three patrol squadrons available within the Naval Air Reserve.

8. (TS) Navy Tactical Data System and Search and Rescue Ships (DLG/DLGN)

a. CINCPAC has stated a requirement for two Navy Tactical Data System (NTDS) equipped ships and one additional Search and Rescue (SAR) ship during CY 1966, to provide more comprehensive coverage in the Positive Identification and Radar Advisory Zone (PIRAZ) and additional SAR service in the Tonkin Gulf. The Pacific Fleet is restricted from deploying additional ships due to a paucity of assets. The only feasible method of providing them is to periodically rotate Atlantic Fleet ships to the Western Pacific to make up the deficits in the Pacific Fleet capability, while at the same time accelerating, to the degree possible, completion of follow-on ships of this new class. It is anticipated that the PACOM requirement for a LANTCOM NTDS ship will be reduced to one in late CY 1967 as additional Pacific Fleet NTDS ships are commissioned.

9. (TS) Amphibious Warfare Ships

a. CINCPAC required an additional dock landing ship (LSD) from June to December 1967 to provide two fast LSDs in the Western Pacific. The only source of additional assets is the Atlantic Fleet. One LSD would be deployed from the Atlantic Fleet during that period.

b. CINCPAC also requires an additional amphibious assault ship (LPH) for nine months of 1967. This asset also would have to be provided from Atlantic Fleet assets. One LPH would be permanently transferred to the Pacific.

10. (TS) Ammunition Ship (AE)

a. The requirement for an additional AE in the Western Pacific would be satisfied by the continuous rotation of an additional AE from LANTCOM, reducing LANTCOM assets to six. This would have an adverse effect on LANTCOM's contingency response capability, training and overhaul schedules, personnel, and would extend deployment periods.

11. (TS) Impact on CINCLANT

a. The Atlantic Fleet would, at the end of CY 1967, be continuously providing to PACOM two and six-tenths CVA or equivalent CVA, 22 destroyer types, one amphibious ship, two ammunition ships, and one patrol squadron, and would have provided one-time deployments of one cruiser, one destroyer type, and one amphibious ship. Exclusive of those forces deployed to USCINCEUR, CINCLANT would have deployed to other commands 42 percent of his attack carriers, 12 percent of his cruisers, 27 percent of his destroyer types, 10 percent of his troop lift capability, 36 percent of his ammunition ships, and eight percent of his patrol squadrons.

b. The effects on CINCLANT's capability to execute his assigned tasks is as follows:

(1) All those forces deployed to CINCPAC would change from NATO Category A to Category B, reflecting a degradation in CINCLANT's capability to provide NATO forces in a timely manner.

(2) During CY 1967 CINCLANT would have available only 17 CVA months to support his contingency plans and to provide augmentation to other unified commanders. His usable CVA assets would be reduced by an average of 20 percent over the year, and during the latter half of the year it would be reduced by over 50 percent.

12. (TS) Impact on USCINCEUR

a. USCINCEUR's attack carrier and cruiser assets would be reduced by at least 50 percent and his destroyer assets would be reduced by 25 percent.

b. This reduction in forces assigned to USCINCEUR will seriously impact on his contribution to the implementation of the SIOP/SSP due to his having one carrier available only part of the time.

c. His capability to respond to contingencies within his area of responsibility and reinforce CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA for operations in the MEAFSA area would similarly be reduced.

APPENDIX C

TABLE I - US AIR FORCE

REVIEW OF CERTAIN US MILITARY FORCES ASSUMING TOTAL CINCPAC CY 66 AND CY 67 FORCE REQUIREMENTS ARE MET

SEA DEPLOYMENTS END CY 1967	REMAINING FORCES					ADD'L COMMITMENTS TO NATO BY M/D + 30 (MAJOR UNITS ONLY)	MAJOR FORCE DEFICIENCIES RESULTING FROM CINCPAC'S PROPOSED FORCE DEPLOYMENTS (SEE ANNEX HERETO FOR RATIONALE)
	PACOM	EUCOM	STRICOM	OTHER	APPROVED BUT NOT AVAILABLE 31 Dec 66		
*TFS 40 1/	4 2/	13 3/	4 4/	26 5/	2 6/	37 7/	20 TFS 8/
**TBS (B-57) 1 9/	1	-	-	-	-		
**FIS 1 10/	2 11/	4		1 12/	-		
***TRS 7 13/	1	5 14/	2 15/	4 16/	1 17/	8 18/	5 TRS 19/
**TCS (C-130) 2 20/	12	3 21/	8 22/	1 23/	-	12 24/	4 TCS 25/
**TASS 5 26/	-	-	-	-	-		16 O-1s 38/
ACS 9 27/	-	1	-	4 29/	1 28/		30/ 15 AC-47s 39/
**AGIL (C-123) 8	-	-	-	-	-		31/ 8 C-123 (AGIL)
**ABCCC (C-130) 7 32/	-	-	-	-	-		4 C-130 (ABCCC) 33/
**AIR RESCUE 2 34/ SQDNS	5	2	-	5	-		

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APPENDIX C

TABLE I - US AIR FORCE (cont'd)

REVIEW OF CERTAIN US MILITARY FORCES ASSUMING TOTAL CINCPAC CY 66 AND CY 67 FORCE REQUIREMENTS ARE MET

SEA DEPLOYMENTS END CY 1967	REMAINING FORCES					ADD'L COMMITMENTS TO NATO BY M/D + 30 (MAJOR UNITS ONLY)	MAJOR FORCE DEFICIENCIES RESULTING FROM CINCPAC'S PROPOSED FORCE DEPLOYMENTS (SEE ANNEX HERETO FOR RATIONALE)
	PACOM	EUCOM	STRICOM	OTHER	APPROVED BUT NOT AVAILABLE 31 Dec 66		
***AIRLIFT (CV-2/7) 1[35] SQDNS	-	-	-	-	-		8 CV-2/7
**AIRLIFT (CV-2) 9[36] SQDNS							48 CV-2
**ARDF 2 [37] SQDNS							

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* Figures reflect the probable program required to meet CINCPAC CY 66 deployments that extend thru Apr 67 and CINCPAC CY 67 deployments that extend thru Sep 67. Figures reflect FY 1/68 program.

** No change from CINCPAC's CY 66 (adjusted) requirements for CY 67.

*** Includes CINCPAC's CY 66 and CY 67 proposed deployments.

TABLE I - US AIR FORCE

FOOTNOTES

1/ Includes 5 TFS deferred by SECDEF but included in adjusted requirement to deploy in CY 67; also includes five additional TFS identified in CINCPAC's CY 67 force requirements.

2/ PACOM peacetime force deployment includes 6 PACOM TFSs and 5 TAC TFSs on rotation. Force in-place drops to 2 TFSs by FY 3/68 assuming Southeast Asia conflict continues.

3/ M-day commitment is for 21 TFS. Force in-place drops to 13 at end FY 1/68, then increases to 20 by FY 4/68.

4/ 1 TFS formed but not combat ready (Cat III test), 3 TFS in unit training.

5/ A total of 26 RTU TFSs (F-100, F-105, F-4C/D).

6/ Within the currently approved TFS force; 2 squadrons are not equipped.

7/ 37 TFSs are identified in the US reply to NATO document DPC/D (66) 1 as potential strategic reserve at end CY 67. As indicated in JCSM 520-66, dated 19 Aug 66, these forces would be available in Europe by D+30.

8/ Reflects the difference (529 aircraft) between the approved force of 86 squadrons (adjusted to 89) and the force required (109 squadrons) to meet all requirements.

9/ B-57 squadron considered equivalent to 1 TFS.

10/ F-102 squadron DANANG/CLARK.

11/ 1 F-102 squadron Clark; 1 F-102 squadron NAHA.

12/ FIS in Alaska must be retained through FY 68 because of lack of F-4 resources to perform mission on rotation basis from CONUS.

13/ 7 squadrons (3 RF-4, 2 RF-101 and 2 RB-66) of varying UE; does not include 10 WB-66D/EB-66D undergoing modification and scheduled for deployment in July 1967.

14/ NATO M-day commitment of 8 TRS with 2 dual-based squadrons in CONUS (1 EB-57 and 1 RF-4).

15/ One dual-based RF-4 squadron committed to NATO, one in unit training.

16/ Equivalent of 4 TRSs (RF-4, RF-101 and RB-66) in RTU role.

17/ Squadron just received equipment - not ready.

18/ 8 TRSs are identified in the US reply to NATO document DPC/D (66)1 as potential strategic reserve at end CY 67. As indicated in JCSM 520-66, dated 19 Aug 66, 9 squadrons would be available in Europe by D+30.

19/ Reflects shortfall of 5 TRSs.

20/ Validated by JCS and deferred by SECDEF.

21/ Increase from 2 in FY 3/67. Third squadron replaces C-124 squadron. See footnote 24.

22/ One-half TCS TDY to Panama.

23/ Alaskan Air Command.

24/ The US reply to NATO document DPC/D (66)1 does not identify transport aircraft beyond end CY 66. As specified in JCSM 520-66, dated 19 Aug 66, five M-day squadrons are required (3 in-place and 2 in CONUS) and 10 additional squadrons are identified to be available in Europe by D+30.

TABLE I - US AIR FORCE

FOOTNOTES (cont'd)

25/ Reflects difference between attainable and required forces.
26/ Squadrons will be fully equipped in Nov 66. One squadron 30 UE and 4 squadrons 53 UE.
27/ Includes the following types of air commando squadrons with varying UE: 1 fighter, 2 composite, 4 carrier, 1 psyco war and 1 fire support.
28/ One A-1E squadron not equipped pending transfer of VNAF resources.
29/ Three squadrons deployable (1 B-26, 1 C-47/U-10 and C-123). One squadron assigned to USCINCSO (composite B-26/T-28/C-46/C-47/U-10).
30/ One TFS supports SAW forces.
31/ Not available before early CY 68.
32/ Three C-130s in Southeast Asia. Adjusted requirement includes four additional C-130s.
33/ Requested for arrival in Aug 66; two available Jan/Feb 67, two more available Jun/Jul 67.
34/ One fixed wing and one helicopter squadrons. Adjusted requirements includes additional HC-130s (11) and HH-43 helicopters (3). All of HC-130s cannot close until FY 4/67.
35/ No buy approved. Earliest availability **for CV-7 is FY 1969. Earliest availability for CV-2 is FY 2/68.**
36/ Six squadrons in-place, one of which is a training activity, in the process of being transferred to USAF from Army. Adjusted requirements include 3 additional squadrons. Earliest availability is late CY 67.
37/ Two squadrons in Southeast Asia. Total requirement is 47 RC-47 including 12 RC-47s contained in CINCPAC's CY 66 (adjusted) requirement. Last aircraft should close Dec 66.
38/ CINCPAC requested closure of 5 in Feb 67, 5 in Mar 67, 3 in Apr 67 and 3 in May 67; 5 available in May 67 and 11 available in Jun 67.
39/ Not available before Feb 67.

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ANNEX TO APPENDIX C

US AIR FORCE RATIONALE

1. (TS) The impact on Air Force capability in FY 1/68 of CINCPAC's CY 1966 (adjusted) requirements and CY 1967 force requirements can be summarized as follows, based on the conditions that CINCPAC's requirements will be validated, and there will not be a reserve callup:

a. The US Air Force tactical fighter, tactical reconnaissance and tactical airlift force would be under-equipped by approximately 20 (22+ squadrons at 24 UE) tactical fighter squadrons, five tactical reconnaissance squadrons and four troop carrier squadrons (C-130), assuming that attrition losses in Southeast Asia remain consistent with current experience.

b. The rapid deployment capability in the CONUS will be limited to one tactical reconnaissance squadron that is NATO-committed and dual-based in the CONUS.

c. The EUCOM in-theater reconnaissance force will be reduced by approximately 22 percent and the ECM/ELINT force eliminated. Also, during the period October 1966-January 1967, only 82 percent of the USAFE in-theater reconnaissance force will be combat-ready with capability ranging from completely combat-ready through marginally combat-ready.

d. Visible deterrent posture and nonnuclear response capability around the eastern periphery of China would be greatly reduced. Pending reconstitution, rapid deployment from Southeast Asia would be required to restore capability if circumstances dictated such a restoration.

e. Provision of trained personnel for Southeast Asia rotation and replacement necessitates sharply increased training activity in CONUS and high personnel turnover rates within tactical forces and among tactical fighter, strategic, defense and other forces. The high turnover rate for personnel transitioning from one weapon system to another will temporarily reduce skill levels; further, some adverse effect upon unit efficiency can be anticipated. With a large portion of the US Air Force tactical force in Southeast Asia, personnel problems associated with sustaining the deployed forces will intensify as time goes on.

f. Continued support of high-tempo operations in Southeast Asia has created shortages of pilots trained in particular aircraft and resulted in the requirement for drastic actions to rectify the situation. The impacts on USAFE, in particular, are undesirable and incompatible with our commitments to NATO. For example: The over-all USAFE crew ratio has been reduced to a "1-to-1" basis; aircrew work week in USAFE squadrons has been increased to 100 hours, conversion programs to new and different aircraft, now under way, require temporary additional reallocation of essential target commitments to other already-converted units; Forward Air Controllers (FACs), normally in the field with elements of the 7th US Army, have had to be recalled to squadron duty for crew application against nuclear strike plan (NSP) requirements; staff personnel of squadrons and wings have likewise been crew-committed against NSP requirements; and a considerable proportion of normal training requirements has been curtailed, as has the support of the theater air base vulnerability tests, air defense exercise support, and availability for close air support and other combined operations. Any increase in Southeast Asia deployments would aggravate an already critical situation.

g. Logistic support of deployed forces would require further procurement authority for aircraft, spares, equipment and expendables.

h. In view of currently approved force deployments and construction, the planned jet air base loading in Vietnam will provide some limited USAF tactical jet force posture flexibility. This capability could be used to beddown some of the additional seven TFS or some of the approved VNAF jet squadrons. However, the operationally acceptable basing of seven additional USAF jet squadrons in RVN would require the construction of one new air base, V-1. The beddown of 27 USAF jet strike squadrons in Vietnam would then approximate four squadrons at Bien Hoa, Cam Ranh Bay, Danang, Phan Rang, Phu Cat, and Tuy Hoa with the remaining three squadrons at V-1. All tactical jet fighter air bases in Thailand are loaded to capacity with current deployments. Nam Phong airfield is being constructed only to a bare base status. The addition of three tactical fighter squadrons into Thailand would require the completion of Nam Phong to a main operating base capability. These minimum new air base construction requirements of Base V-1 and completion of Nam Phong would accommodate only a part of the ten additional squadrons projected. In addition, construction would be required at some of the existing bases in Vietnam in order to reach the required base loading capability.

i. Command, control and communications requirements would be essentially limited to those needed to support the additional jet air base in South Vietnam and to upgrade the existing bare base in Thailand. Standard base communications, air traffic control, and meteorlogical facilities would be involved. These could be provided initially from existing Air Force resources but replacement equipment would have to be procured during FY 1968 if an appropriate reserve of this type equipment is to be maintained.

j. The nuclear and nonnuclear capability of USAFE M-day tactical fighter forces would be degraded by the drawdown to 13 squadrons (288 aircraft) at end FY 1/68. The greatest drawdown would occur in Europe in July 1967 when the tactical fighter force would be drawn down to 11 squadrons (252 aircraft). However, during August and September, two squadron equivalents could be returned which provides USAFE with 13 squadrons at end FY 1/68. Seven additional squadrons (126 aircraft) could be returned to USAFE during the remainder of FY 1968.

2. (S) In FY 1/68, the attainable tactical fighter squadron force posture, as compared with the required posture to meet world-wide commitments, would be as follows:

	Attainable Force Posture		Required Posture	
	Sqdns	Acft	Sqdns	Acft
Southeast Asia	40	(720)	40	(720)
Pacific Islands	4	(72)	11	(234)
Europe	13	(288)	21	(486)
CONUS				
Deployable	0		37	(715)
RTU	26	(468)	0*	
Not Combat Ready (forming, training, etc.)	4	(78)	0	
Nonequipped	2	(0)	0	
	89**	(1,626)	109	(2,155)

(3) (S) **In the event of an increase in international tension, the 26 tactical fighter RTU squadrons in the CONUS could revert to deployable status at reduced capability in two to six weeks. However, this would result in the termination of all replacement training being conducted by these units. In addition, since 37 tactical fighter squadrons are required to deploy to Europe by D+30, at end FY 1968, there** would be a remaining shortfall of 22 combat-ready tactical fighter squadrons (18+ squadron equivalent at 24UE) to meet NATO commitments and augmentation requirements. A CONUS deployable force of 37 tactical fighter squadrons is the minimum force needed to permit response to a NATO contingency or, alternatively, to provide additional capability in the event of CHICOM intervention. In addition, such a force provides a needed complement for the CONUS training capability by acting as a source and reservoir for trained rotational personnel, a consideration which will become

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* Requirement for equivalent capability in training resources now provided by 26 RTU squadrons.
** 86 squadron force converted to 89 squadrons.

increasingly important as the conflict in Southeast Asia continues.

4. (S) In FY 1/68, the attainable tactical reconnaissance force posture, as compared with the required posture to meet world-wide commitments, would be as follows:

	Attainable Force Posture*	Required Posture
Southeast Asia	7	7
Pacific Islands	1	2
Europe	5	8
CONUS		
Deployable	1**	8
RTU	4	0***
Not deployable	2	0
	20	25

5. (S) In the event of an increase in international tension, the four-squadron equivalent of reconnaissance RTU squadrons could revert to deployable status at reduced capability in two to six weeks. However, this would result in the termination of all replacement training for Southeast Asia. In addition, since eight tactical reconnaissance squadrons are required to deploy to Europe by D+30, there would be an aggregate shortfall of five combat-ready tactical reconnaissance squadrons. This shortfall does not include the anticipated requirement for two squadrons of RF-4 for attrition. In addition to the shortfall of squadrons, the availability of RF-4C aircrews is rapidly approaching the critical point where the only source of combat-ready RF-4C aircrews, who have not completed a tour in Southeast Asia, will be USAFE crews since the RF-4 RTU is not scheduled to provide aircrews until February 1967.

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* One squadron of 15 EB-57 aircraft not reflected has assumed a dual-base commitment to NATO.

** Includes 1 RF-4C squadron dual-based in CONUS committed to NATO.

*** Requirement for equivalent capability in training resources now provided by 4 RTU squadrons.

6. (S) In FY 1/68, the attainable C-130 troop carrier squadron posture, as compared with the required posture to meet world-wide commitments, would be as follows:

	Attainable Force Posture	Required Posture
Southeast Asia	2*	2*
Pacific Islands	12	12
EUROPE	3	3
ALASKA	1	1
STRICOM	8**	12***
	26	30

7. (S) Assuming that troop carrier resources deployed to Panama are available for emergency deployment to Europe, there would be a shortfall of four C-130 squadrons.

8. (S) If CINCPAC's CY 1966 (adjusted) requirements and CY 1967 force requirements are validated, there will be shortfalls or slippage in providing HC-123s (AGIL), C-130s (ABCCC), CV-7s, CV-2s and O-1s for the following reasons:

a. The AGIL aircraft are a part of a test program and the type of aircraft has not been selected. Completion of the test program and modification of the selected aircraft with an improved system should be available in CY 1968.

b. The four additional C-130 ABCCC aircraft are requested for August 1966 deployment. The modification schedule is such that the first aircraft will be available in January 1967 and the fourth in July 1967.

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* Deferred by SECDEF, reclama by JCS, reclama not approved by SECDEF.

** One-half squadron deployed to Panama, 3 squadron equivalents in RTU.

*** Augmentation for NATO.

c. No approval for purchase of CV-7s. The CV-7 squadron could not be available until FY 1969 and then there would be no training base.

d. The CV-2 squadrons requested are not in the inventory. If go-ahead were given in November, the first squadron could be in place approximately a year later, with the others following in quarterly increments.

e. The requirement for additional O-1 aircraft beginning in FY 3/67 cannot be met on schedule. In May and June 1967 there will be four and 12 O-1s, respectively, in command support which could be diverted to UE for the additional requirement of 16 O-1s. This assumes approval of the Cessna procurement and the hold on last O-1s from the Army continues.

9. Mobilization could provide 20 deployable ANG tactical fighter squadrons (409 aircraft minimum) and 12 ANG tactical reconnaissance squadrons. While not nuclear capable and possessing less modern aircraft, the TFSs would partially provide for the 22 TFS shortfall anticipated. By using older equipment, shortfalls in TRSs would be reduced to zero, and the CONUS posture improved. TCS shortfalls would be reduced through use of C-119 aircraft. Some personnel shortages would be alleviated.

APPENDIX D

TABLE I - US MARINE CORPS

REVIEW OF CERTAIN US MILITARY FORCES AT END CY 1966 ASSUMING CINCPAC CY 1966 FORCE REQUIREMENTS ARE MET

SEA DEPLOYMENTS END CY 1966	REMAINING FORCES					ADD'L COMMITMENTS TO NATO BY M/D + 30 (MAJOR UNITS ONLY)	MAJOR FORCE DEFICIENCIES RESULTING FROM CINCPAC'S PROPOSED FORCE DEPLOYMENTS (SEE ANNEX HERETO FOR RATIONALE)
	PACOM	EUCOM	LANTCOM	OTHER	APPROVED BUT NOT AVAILABLE 31 Dec 66		
2 Div (Rein)(18 Bns)	3/9 Div 1/	1/9 Div	6/9 Div (6 Bns)	2/9 Div 2/	6/9 Div	2 Div/Wing Teams 3/	4/
1 MAW (Rein) 5 VMF Sqdns	1 MAW 5 VMF Sqdns 5/ 3 VMA Sqdns 5/		1 MAW 5 VMF Sqdns 4 VMA Sqdns		2 HMM Sqdns	18 Bns 10 VMF Sqdns	1 VMA Sqdn
5 VMA Sqdns	3 HMM Sqdns 2 HMH Sqdns (-)		5 HMM Sqdns 1 HMH Sqdn 1 VMO Sqdn		1 VMO Sqdn + 6/	8 VMA Sqdns 10 HMM Sqdns 2 HMH Sqdns	
7 HMM Sqdns							
1 HMH Det 3 VMO Sqdns (-)							

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TABLE I - US MARINE CORPS

FOOTNOTES

1/ 3/9 div/wing team in Okinawa provides BLTs and HMMs for SLFs.

2/ 1/9 div deployed as Guantanamo defense force. 1/9 div/wing team as Carib ready force.

3/ 2 div/wing teams committed for M-day assignment to NATO; one to arrive by M+30, the second en route at that time for arrival by M+60.

4/ The Marine Corps notes a special consideration relating to the Okinawa-based PACOM amphibious reserve elements; see Annex hereto.

5/ Requires relocation of a LANTCOM MAG VF/VA with VMFA and two VMAs. Relocation of this MAG VF/VA from LANTCOM to PACOM is planned for Dec 66 concurrent with the activation of a readiness training group in FMFLANT to provide required replacement support for deployed units. By relocating the MAG VF/VA in a cadre status to reform in MIDPAC/EASTPAC in Dec 66, disruption of WESTPAC/SEAsia replacement training is avoided. Deployable readiness date for reformed MAG VF/VA estimated 3rd quarter CY 67.

6/ These units will be available to PACOM by mid CY 67.

TABLE II - US MARINE CORPS

REVIEW OF CERTAIN US MILITARY FORCES
AT END CY 1967 ASSUMING CINCPAC CY 1967 FORCE REQUIREMENTS ARE MET
(EXCLUDING POSSIBLE REQUIREMENT FOR 6/9 MARINE DIVISION IN I CORPS, AS INDICATED BY CINCPAC, IF ROK MARINE OR ROK ARMY FORCES NOT AVAILABLE)

SEA DEPLOYMENTS END CY 1967 5/	REMAINING FORCES 5/					ADD'L COMMITMENTS TO NATO BY M/D + 30 (MAJOR UNITS ONLY)	MAJOR FORCE DEFICIENCIES RESULTING FROM CINCPAC'S PROPOSED FORCE DEPLOYMENTS (SEE ANNEX HERETO FOR RATIONALE)
	PACOM	EUCOM	LANTCOM	OTHER	APPROVED BUT NOT AVAILABLE 31 Dec 67		
2 Div (Rein)(18 Bns)	1 Div 1/ (9 Bns)	1/9 Div	6/9 Div	2/9 Div 2/	None	2 Div/Wing Teams 3/ 18 Bns	3 HMM Sqdns 1 VMA Sqdn 1 VMO Sqdn 4/
1 MAW (Rein)	1 MAW		1 MAW				
5 VMF Sqdns	5 VMF Sqdns		5 VMF Sqdns			10 VMF Sqdns	
5 VMA Sqdns	3 VMA Sqdns		4 VMA Sqdns			8 VMA Sqdns	
10 HMM Sqdns	3 HMM Sqdns		4 HMM Sqdns			10 HMM Sqdns	
1 HMH Sqdn	1 HMH Sqdn		1 HMH Sqdn			2 HMH Sqdns	
4 VMO Sqdns			1 VMO Sqdn				
	1 Helo MAG 1 HMM Sqdn 1 VMO Sqdn Not in PACOM 6/						

TABLE III - US MARINE CORPS

REVIEW OF CERTAIN US MILITARY FORCES
AT END CY 1967 ASSUMING CINCPAC CY 1967 FORCE REQUIREMENTS ARE MET
(ASSUMING ADDITIONAL 6/9 MARINE DIVISION IS REQUIRED IN I CORPS, AS INDICATED BY CINCPAC, IF ROK MARINE OR ROK ARMY FORCES NOT AVAILABLE)

SEA DEPLOYMENTS END CY 1967 5/	REMAINING FORCES 5/					ADD'L COMMITMENTS TO NATO BY M/D + 30 (MAJOR UNITS ONLY)	MAJOR FORCE DEFICIENCIES RESULTING FROM CINCPAC'S PROPOSED FORCE DEPLOYMENTS (SEE ANNEX HERETO FOR RATIONALE)
	PACOM	EUCOM	LANTCOM	OTHER	APPROVED BUT NOT AVAILABLE 31 Dec 67		
2 6/9 Div (Rein) (24 Bns) 1 MAW (Rein) 5 VMF Sqdns 5 VMA Sqdns 10 HMM Sqdns 1 HMH Sqdn 4 VMO Sqdns	6/9 Div 1/ (6 Bns) 1 MAW(-)	1/9 Div	3/9 Div 1 MAW(-) 5 VMF Sqdns 4 VMA Sqdns 1 HMM Sqdn	2/9 2/ Div	None	2 Div/Wing 3/ Teams 18 Bns 10 VMF Sqdns 8 VMA Sqdns 10 HMM Sqdns 2 HMH Sqdns	6/9 Div 1 MAG (Helo) 3 HMM Sqdns 1 VMA Sqdn 1 VMO Sqdn 4/
Additional aviation units required to support 6/9 Division 1 MAG (VF/VA) 3 VMFA/VMA Sqdns 1 MAG (Helo) 3 HMM, 1 HMH and 1 VMO	3 VMF Sqdns 2 VMA Sqdns 3 HMM Sqdns 1 HMH Sqdn						Additional aviation units required to support 6/9 division 1 MAG (VF/VA) 3 VMFA/VMA Sqdns 1 MAG (helo) 3 HMM, 1 HMH and 1 VMO

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US MARINE CORPS

TABLE II AND TABLE III

FOOTNOTES

1/ 6/9 div/wing team in Okinawa provides BLTs and HMMs for SLFs.

2/ 1/9 div deployed as Guantanamo defense force. 1/9 div/wing team as Carib ready force.

3/ 2 div/wing teams committed for M-day assignment to NATO; one to arrive by M+30, the second en route at that time for arrival by M+60.

4/ The Marine Corps notes a special consideration relating to the Okinawa-based PACOM amphibious reserve elements; see Annex hereto.

5/ Marine Corps resources cannot sustain deployments to South Vietnam and WESTPAC additional to those units currently deployed.

6/ Would require transfer from LANTCOM.

ANNEX TO APPENDIX D

US MARINE CORPS RATIONALE

1. (TS) CINCPAC's stated CY 1967 requirements would commit an additional helicopter group (one VMO and three HMM squadrons) to South Vietnam, and an additional 3/9 division, a helicopter group (one HMM and one HMH squadron), an aircraft wing headquarters group and a wing service group to Okinawa. If these forces were provided, the Marine Corps commitment to WESTPAC would total three divisions (-) and two aircraft wings (-) (six VMF, six VMA, 13 HMM, and two HMH squadrons), with two divisions and one reinforced aircraft wing in South Vietnam and one division (-) and an aircraft wing (-) in Okinawa/Japan. Without authorization to activate additional forces, Marine Corps combat units in the United States would then total 1 3/9 divisions and one reinforced aircraft wing (nine VMF, six VMA, four HMM, and one HMH squadrons); of this CONUS based force, 3/9 division and certain aviation elements are continuously deployed.

2. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have indicated that an active, combat-ready, uncommitted division/wing team each in LANTCOM and PACOM is the minimum necessary amphibious posture required under current circumstances to meet contingencies and to provide the national strategic amphibious reserve. This capability does not now exist, due to Phase II A(R) deployments to Southeast Asia. The activation and training of the authorized additional Marine Corps division (for a total of four active) will be completed in May 1967 and will restore this capability (less one VMA squadron). In the event that the CINCPAC CY 1967 deployments are made, this capability would be degraded since reconstitution of units in the uncommitted division/wing could not commence until June 1967. This situation is under study by the Marine

Corps and the study will be completed after finite CY 1967 requirements have been developed.

3. CINCPAC CY 1967 requirements call for the in-country commitment of another helicopter group of three HMM squadrons and one VMO squadron, plus certain ground units. If these requirements are approved, the Marine Corps would require a commensurate increase in the training and rotation base to support the deployments and reconstitution of these units, to include personnel, materiel, and necessary support, in order to restore an uncommitted division/wing team in PACOM.

4. CINCPAC CY 1967 requirements call for additional deployments to Okinawa of 3/9 division, a Marine aircraft wing headquarters group, a wing service group, and a helicopter group of one HMM squadron, one HMH squadron, and one VMO squadron. These deployments would likewise require increases in the training and rotation base. Additionally, the HMM and the VMO squadrons would have to be transferred from LANTCOM and would result in an imbalance in LANTCOM aviation assets.

5. (TS) In his CY 1967 requirements, CINCPAC indicated that an additional 6/9 division would be required in I Corps if ROK Army or ROK Marine units were not available. If this increment were to be provided by the Marine Corps, it would have to be reconstituted at the earliest possible time in order to maintain one uncommitted division in both PACOM and LANTCOM. Further, although not stated in CINCPAC's requirements for this 6/9 division, it is considered that additional aviation units would be required in-country for air support;

the following aviation units are considered necessary, and would require reconstitution in the uncommitted division/wing teams:

1 MAG (VF/VA)
  (2 VMFA sqdns)
  (1 VMA sqdn)
1 MAG (helicopter)
  (3 HMM sqdns)
  (1 HMH sqdn)
  (1 VMO sqdn)

6. (TS) The Marine Corps is continuing to study its force structure and capabilities in light of the South Vietnam situation and the over-all threat in PACOM and elsewhere. In this connection, the concept of the "uncommitted" division/wing team in PACOM brings into question the status of the PACOM amphibious reserve forces. These forces are deployed to Okinawa/Japan in order to provide CINCPAC with the minimum capability to respond, without delay, to a possible escalation of the war in South Vietnam; to counter overt communist aggression elsewhere in the PACOM area; and to provide, on a continuing basis, forces to support selected operations in South Vietnam. As a result, the PACOM amphibious reserve force is constantly subject to immediate total commitment within the WESTPAC area and is thus not, in a meaningful sense, an "uncommitted" force.

7. (S) The Marine Corps has an inadequate number of CONUS billets in certain skills and specialities to support present and proposed overseas billets while ensuring 24-month tours in CONUS prior to reassignments overseas. Therefore, additional units may be required in order to provide for the necessary CONUS billets.

8. Mobilization of the 4th division/wing team and Class III reservists would enable the Marine Corps to meet all of CINCPAC's requirements, less the helicopter MAG for Okinawa. Aircraft assets are sufficient to equip only one reserve helicopter MAG (3 HMM, 1 VMO), and then only by utilizing those assets required by the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing. Equipping a second MAG (1 HMM, 1 HMH, 1 VMO) could not be accomplished until CY 1970. In addition to helicopter shortfalls, deficiencies would exist in communications-electronics equipment and some tentage for ground units. Mobilization will not bring about a marked improvement in existing MOS shortages because the same skill shortages exist in the reserve as in the active structure. In order for CINCPAC's requirements, less the Okinawa helicopter MAG, to be met and sustained, mobilization and extension of terms of service would be required on an indefinite basis. It is estimated that, following demobilization, it would take a minimum of six years to reconstitute the organized reserve.